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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
SLOVITER, Circuit Judge. 
 
Appellant Dean Dairy Products, Inc., d/b/a Fairmont 
Products, Inc., appeals the district court's imposition of a 
$4,031,000 civil penalty against it for Clean Water Act 
violations. Dean Dairy contends that the district court erred 
when it assessed the economic benefit Dean Dairy gained 
during the period of the Clean Water Act violations on the 
basis of Dean Dairy's "wrongful profits." Dean Dairy also 
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contends that the district court improperly looked to the 
financial condition of Dean Dairy's parent company in 
evaluating whether it could afford the substantial penalty 
imposed. The American Frozen Food Institute, the Chemical 
Manufacturers Association, the American Automobile 
Manufacturers Association, the International Dairy Foods 
Association, and the Grocery Manufacturers of America 
support Dean Dairy's appeal as amicus curiae. We have 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. S 1291. 
 
I. 
 
The underlying facts of this case are undisputed and are 
comprehensively set forth in the district court's published 
opinion, United States v. Municipal Auth. of Union 
Township, 929 F. Supp. 800 (M.D. Pa. 1996). Briefly stated, 
Dean Dairy, operating in Union Township, Belleville, 
Pennsylvania, is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Dean Foods, 
Inc., the country's largest milk processor. Since 1974 Dean 
Dairy's wastewater, a result of the production of sour 
cream, cottage cheese, yogurt and ice cream, has been 
discharged and treated by Union Township's Publicly 
Owned Treatment Works (POTW). Union Township collected 
a user fee based upon the volume of wastewater and the 
amount of conventional non-toxic pollutants treated at the 
plant, including Total Suspended Solids (or TSS) and 
Biological Oxygen Demand (or BOD). In June 1989, 
pursuant to requirements of the United States 
Environmental Protection Agency, Union Township issued 
to Dean Dairy an Industrial User Wastewater Discharge 
Permit ("the IU permit") which established monthly average 
limits and daily maximum limits for TSS and BOD and for 
flow volume. 
 
Beginning in July 1989, Dean Dairy exceeded the limits 
set forth in its IU permit. Its wastewater, containing the 
impermissibly high levels of BOD and TSS, flowed from 
Union Township's POTW into the nearby Kishacoquillas 
Creek, which was damaged as a result. There is no dispute 
that because Dean Dairy issued monitoring reports to 
Union Township on a monthly basis, it had been aware of 
its violations since July 1989. 
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In 1994, the United States filed a civil enforcement action 
against Dean Dairy under the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. 
S 1251 et seq., for close to 1800 violations of the IU permit 
and for numerous interferences with the POTW. Following 
discovery, the United States moved for and was granted 
summary judgment on the issue of Dean Dairy's liability for 
the CWA violations. The action against the Municipal 
Authority of Union Township was settled and therefore the 
Authority is not a party to this appeal. Dean Dairy does not 
contest its liability for the violations. Its appeal is limited to 
the amount of the civil penalty imposed. 
 
The district court held a three-day bench trial to 
determine the appropriate penalty under the Clean Water 
Act. Under 33 U.S.C. S 1319(d), a violator of a permit issued 
pursuant to the Act shall be subject to a civil penalty not 
to exceed $25,000 per day for each violation. This section 
further provides that in establishing the penalty the court 
shall consider the following six factors: "[T]he seriousness of 
the violation or violations, the economic benefit (if any) 
resulting from the violation, any history of such violations, 
any good-faith efforts to comply with the applicable 
requirements, the economic impact of the penalty on the 
violator, and such other matters as justice may require." Id. 
 
The district court found Dean Dairy liable for 1,754 
violations of its IU permit and 79 instances of interference 
with Union Township's POTW between July 1989 and April 
1994. It also found that Dean Dairy continued to violate its 
IU permit even after the United States filed suit. Although 
Dean Dairy took certain steps to address the violations of 
its permit between 1991 and 1994, the district court found 
these efforts were belated and ineffective. It was only the 
construction of a $865,000 pretreatment system, which 
became operational in April 1995, that succeeded in 
reducing Dean Dairy's pollutants to permissible levels. 
 
Important to the issue before us is that Dean Dairy 
considered various options to meet its permit obligations 
but, as the district court found, "it continued to produce at 
a volume which it recognized was very likely to generate 
levels of BOD and TSS beyond that allowed by its IU 
permit. [Dean Dairy] chose not to reduce production volume 
because it viewed the concomitant reduction in earnings as 
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too high a price to pay for compliance with the Clean Water 
Act." 929 F. Supp. at 805. 
 
Although the district court applied the six statutory 
factors a court must consider in assessing the appropriate 
penalty for a CWA violation, the appellant presents the case 
as if the court concentrated almost exclusively on the 
"economic benefit" factor. In fact, the district court made 
extensive findings of fact and issued conclusions of law on 
each of the six factors. See id. at 802-09. The court noted 
that the history of Dean Diary's violations dated back to 
1989, that the excessive discharges required the 
Pennsylvania Fish and Boat Commission to cease stocking 
fish in areas of the Kishacoquillas Creek, and that its two- 
year delay to take meaningful action to remedy the 
violations did "not speak highly of its good faith in this 
matter." Id. at 803-08. 
 
In connection with its evaluation of the economic benefit 
factor, which is the primary basis of the appeal, the district 
court acknowledged that the parties had previously 
stipulated that Dean Dairy did not realize any economic 
benefit from delaying the capital investments necessary to 
achieve compliance with its IU permit. This was due to the 
unusual fact that, by delaying the construction of the 
pretreatment plant, Dean Dairy was actually losing money 
because it was paying higher usage fees to the POTW for its 
increased volume. Thus, Dean Dairy did not reap an 
economic benefit by delaying the construction of the 
pretreatment plant. The court nevertheless found that Dean 
Dairy did realize an economic benefit during the period of 
the violations because it produced "at a volume above that 
which would have allowed it to operate within its IU 
permit." Id. at 805. 
 
In making the finding of economic benefit, the district 
court relied upon a document produced by Dean Dairy 
during discovery and introduced at trial as Joint Exhibit 18 
that outlined various options by which Dean Dairy could 
comply with its permit. The district court noted that Option 
#4 of that document indicated that Dean Dairy could drop 
PennMaid as a customer and thereby reduce the amount of 
wastewater generated. Dean Dairy recognized, however, in 
Exhibit 18 that losing the revenues from PennMaid would 
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result in a loss of earnings in the amount of $417,000 in 
fiscal year 1994.* 
 
During the damages trial, the government questioned 
Fairmont plant manager Dean Koontz about that document 
in the following exchange: 
 
       Counsel for the United States: Let me turn your 
       attention to Joint Exhibit 18, please. It is entitled 
       Recap of Wastewater Treatment Options . . . . 
 
       *** 
 
       Mr. Koontz: Okay. Yes. This is the information that I 
       fed to Ron Crock based on the costs that Union 
       Township gave us. And he ran some type of analysis 
       with it. 
 
       Q: Ron Crock is the comptroller for Dean Dairy 
       Products, is that correct? 
 
       A: Yes, he is. 
 
       *** 
 
       Q: And Mr. Crock ran numbers using four options, is 
       that right? 
 
       A: Yes it is. 
 
       Q: And one of those options includes Fairmont not 
       building a treatment plant and discharging to the 
       Authority but cutting back on plant volume to reduce 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
* The other three options for wastewater treatment as set forth in Exhibit 
18, were, in brief summary: 
 
       Option #1: Fairmont builds pretreatment plant at cost of $700,000 
       (with obligation to municipal authorities for belt press, filter 
press 
       and/or reed bed filter press); 
 
       Option #2: Fairmont builds pretreatment plant at cost of $1 million 
       dollars with no obligation to municipal authorities; 
 
       Option #3: Fairmont does not build a pretreatment plant leading to 
       substantial (in excess of $100,000 a year) obligation to municipal 
       authorities for belt press, filter press and reed bed filter press. 
 
App. at 15-17. 
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       flow rate which does not allow for growth -- future 
       growth of the plant. Do you see that? 
 
       A: Yes, option four. 
 
       Q: Option number four. . . . [I]t has an estimate of the 
       impact on earnings that this option would involve. Is 
       that correct? 
 
       A: That is the way I read it, yes. 
 
       Q: These are numbers that Mr. Crock arrived at. Is 
       that correct, sir? 
 
       A: Yes. 
 
       Q: Isn't it true that if you reduce volume, you would 
       lose an account by the name of PennMaid according to 
       the scenario? 
 
       A: Yes. This was when we did look at possibilities of 
       reducing volume. The only customer that we could 
       come up with that would have an impact would have 
       been PennMaid because we make only one product for 
       them, cottage cheese. And we could eliminate them as 
       a possible customer, which would have made all of us 
       very happy. 
 
       Q: It would have made you all happy, and it would also 
       have set you back $417,000 for fiscal year '94. Is that 
       correct? 
 
       A: Yes. There would have been a considerable amount 
       of overhead absorption loss by losing that. 
 
App. at 275-77. 
 
In its opinion, the district court commented on Exhibit 
18 as follows: "Production volume at Fairmont was higher 
in each year from 1989 to 1993 than it was in 1994, and, 
therefore, it is reasonable to believe that Fairmont gained at 
least $417,000 in earnings annually during the period of its 
violations. On this basis, the court concludes that between 
July 1989 and April 1994, Fairmont gained approximately 
$2,015,500 by violating its IU permit." 929 F. Supp. at 805. 
The district court also determined that the figure should be 
doubled in order to provide a proper deterrent and 
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punishment, and accordingly imposed a total penalty of 
$4,031,000. 
 
II. 
 
Dean Dairy challenges the district court's analysis of two 
of the six factors to be considered in imposing a CWA civil 
penalty - the economic benefit to the violator and the 
economic impact of a penalty. We consider first its 
contention that the district erred as a matter of law in 
using a "wrongful profits" approach to ascertain whether 
Dean Dairy received any "economic benefit" from its Clean 
Water Act violations. 
 
A. 
 
The Use of "Wrongful Profits" to 
Measure Economic Benefit 
 
Section 1319(d) of the Clean Water Act provides in 
pertinent part: 
 
       Any person who violates . . . this title, or any permit 
       condition or limitation . . . shall be subject to a civil 
       penalty not to exceed $25,000 per day for each 
       violation. In determining the amount of a civil penalty 
       the court shall consider the seriousness of the violation 
       or violations, the economic benefit (if any) resulting 
       from the violation, any history of such violations, any 
       good-faith efforts to comply with the applicable 
       requirements, the economic impact of the penalty on 
       the violator, and such other matters as justice may 
       require. 
 
33 U.S.C. S 1319(d). 
 
The statute does not define the term "economic benefit" 
used in this section. It is apparent, however, that the goal 
of the economic benefit analysis is to prevent a violator 
from profiting from its wrongdoing. In United States v. 
Smithfield Foods, Inc., 972 F. Supp. 338, 348 (E.D. Va. 
1997), the district court explained that "[c]ourts use 
economic benefit analysis to level the economic playing field 
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and prevent violators from gaining an unfair competitive 
advantage." 
 
A similar rationale was also given by the Environmental 
Protection Agency, which emphasized that the reason for 
considering economic benefit to a violator in assessing a 
CWA penalty is to remove or neutralize the economic 
incentive to violate environmental regulations. In a 1990 
Manual to its BEN computer program, established to assist 
in the calculation of civil CWA penalties, the EPA explained: 
 
       An organization's decision to comply with 
       environmental regulations usually implies a 
       commitment of financial resources; both initially, in the 
       form of a capital investment or one-time expenditure, 
       and over time, in the form of annual, continuing 
       expenses. These expenditures might result in better 
       protection of public health or environmental quality; 
       however, they are unlikely to yield any direct economic 
       benefit (i.e., net gain) to the organization. If these 
       financial resources were not used for compliance, they 
       presumably would be invested in projects with an 
       expected direct economic benefit to the organization. 
       This concept of alternative investment; that is, the 
       amount the violator would normally expect to make by 
       not investing in pollution control, is the basis for 
       calculating the economic benefit of noncompliance. As 
       part of the Civil Penalty Policy, EPA uses the Agency's 
       penalty authority to remove or neutralize the economic 
       incentive to violate environmental regulations. In the 
       absence of enforcement and appropriate penalties, it is 
       usually in the organization's best economic interest to 
       delay the commitment of funds for compliance with 
       environmental regulations and to avoid certain other 
       associated costs, such as operating and maintenance 
       expenses. 
 
EPA BEN User's Manual I-6 (July 1990), quoted in Friends 
of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 890 F. 
Supp. 470 (D.S.C. 1995) ("Laidlaw I"). 
 
Few published cases discuss the "economic benefit" 
factor of the Clean Water Act in any detail, and those that 
do are, in large part, district court opinions. In Laidlaw, the 
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court described economic benefit as: "the after-tax present 
value of avoided or delayed expenditures on necessary 
pollution control measures." 890 F. Supp. at 481. The 
theory is that economic benefit "represents the opportunity 
a polluter had to earn a return on funds that should have 
been spent to purchase, operate, and maintain appropriate 
pollution control devices." Id. 
 
This court has previously recognized that a violator's 
economic benefit under the Clean Water Act may not be 
capable of ready determination. In Public Interest Research 
Group of New Jersey, Inc. v. Powell Duffryn Terminals, Inc., 
913 F.2d 64 (3d Cir. 1990), we stated: 
 
       Precise economic benefit to a polluter may be difficult 
       to prove. The Senate Report accompanying the 1987 
       amendment that added the economic benefit factor to 
       section 309(d) recognized that a reasonable 
       approximation of economic benefit is sufficient to meet 
       plaintiff 's burden for this factor. . . . The determination 
       of economic benefit or other factors will not require an 
       elaborate or burdensome evidentiary showing. 
       Reasonable approximations of economic benefit will 
       suffice. 
 
Id. at 80 (citation omitted). 
 
Because of the difficulty of determining the appropriate 
penalty under the Clean Water Act, the court will accord 
the district court's award of a penalty wide discretion, even 
though it represents an approximation. This was 
emphasized by the Supreme Court when it said, more than 
a decade ago, "Congress [made the] assignment of the 
determination of the amount of civil penalties to trial judges 
. . . . Since Congress itself may fix the civil penalties, it may 
delegate that determination to trial judges. In this case, 
highly discretionary calculations that take into account 
multiple factors are necessary in order to set civil penalties 
under the Clean Water Act." Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 
412, 426-27 (1987). 
 
This has been the approach generally followed by the 
courts. In Smithfield Foods, the court recognized that it is 
difficult to prove the precise economic benefit to a polluter, 
but stated that the economic benefit analysis provides an 
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approximation of "the amount of money a company has 
gained over its competitors by failing to comply with the 
law." 972 F. Supp. at 348. See Sierra Club v. Cedar Point 
Oil Co., 73 F.3d 546, 576 (5th Cir. 1996) ("a court need only 
make a `reasonable approximation' of economic benefit 
when calculating a penalty under the CWA") (citation 
omitted); Public Interest Research Group of New Jersey, Inc. 
v. Hercules, Inc., 970 F. Supp. 363, 364 (D.N.J. 1997) ("In 
assessing a penalty under the Clean Water Act, a district 
court has a great amount of discretion."); United States v. 
Sheyenne Tooling & Mfg. Co., 952 F. Supp. 1420, 1422-23 
(D.N.D. 1996) ("It must be understood, however, that 
despite the directional aid and guidance that the six 
enumerated factors in S 1319(d) provide, the calculation of 
a final penalty may often be imprecise and approximate at 
best. Indeed, the accuracy of the final calculations, and the 
figure of penalty that they produce, is as dependant, or 
even more so, upon the provision of complete and accurate 
evidence, as introduced, developed, and explained at trial, 
as it is upon a good evaluation of this information by the 
court."). 
 
Courts have applied different methods in determining the 
appropriate penalty for a Clean Water Act violation. Some 
courts have employed a "top down" approach in which the 
maximum possible penalty is first established, then 
reduced following an examination of the six "mitigating" 
factors. See, e.g., Sierra Club, 73 F.3d at 574-76; Powell 
Duffryn, 913 F.2d at 79; Atlantic States Legal Found., Inc. 
v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 897 F.2d 1128, 1142 (11th Cir. 1990); 
Hawaii's Thousand Friends v. City and County of Honolulu, 
821 F. Supp. 1368, 1395 (D. Haw. 1993); Atlantic States 
Legal Found., Inc. v. Universal Tool & Stamping Co., 786 F. 
Supp. 743, 746-47 (N.D. Ind. 1992). 
 
Other courts have used a "bottom up" approach whereby 
the economic benefit a violator gained by noncompliance is 
established and adjusted upward or downward using the 
remaining five factors in S 1319(d). See , e.g., Smithfield 
Foods, 972 F. Supp. at 354; Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. 
Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 956 F. Supp. 588, 603 
(D.S.C. 1997) ("Laidlaw II"). Because the statute does not 
prescribe either method, it appears that a court is free to 
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use its discretion in choosing the appropriate method. See 
Smithfield Foods, 972 F. Supp. at 354. 
 
Had the district court in this case taken a "top-down" 
approach, it would have begun at the maximum penalty, 
which was approximately $45,825,000, based on the 
statutory penalty of $25,000 a day. Instead, the court 
applied the "bottom up" approach, 929 F. Supp. at 806, by 
determining Dean Dairy's economic benefit acquired 
through the Fairmont plant's production at a volume that 
resulted in more wastewater than permissible under its 
permit. These were knowing violations, as its own 
document demonstrated it was aware that if it had reduced 
its wastewater volume by reducing its production, it would 
have been in compliance with its IU permit. As Koontz 
specifically testified, if Dean Dairy had reduced volume, it 
believed it would have lost PennMaid as a customer. Dean 
Dairy's own document prepared by Ron Crock, its 
controller, demonstrated that this loss of PennMaid would 
have had a negative impact of $417,000 per year.** This 
was the basis on which the district court calculated Dean 
Dairy's economic benefit as $2,015,500, which when 
doubled, resulted in the penalty of $4,031,000. That 
penalty was barely 9% of the maximum statutory penalty to 
which Dean Dairy was subject. 
 
It is not surprising that no published case has used this 
method of ascertaining a violator's economic benefit 
because it is the rare violator who actually loses money by 
delaying compliance with the law. Typically, a violator 
benefits economically by avoiding or delaying the 
construction of antipollution equipment that would have 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
** While the exhibit referred to, and relied upon by the district court 
(and 
specifically the "impact on earnings" portion, see app. at 18) is 
susceptible to different interpretations, including an interpretation that 
earnings could have been affected anywhere from $407,748 to $443,000, 
it was not error, and specifically not clearly erroneous, for the district 
court to have made a factual finding based upon the documentary 
evidence, coupled with the testimony of Koontz, that the continued sale 
to PennMaid had a positive impact of $417,000. Further, it was not error 
to conclude as a matter of law that this impact, which by the company's 
own statements resulted from noncompliant production, could be 
deemed wrongful profits and therefore economic benefit to Dean Dairy. 
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placed it in compliance with its permit. See, e.g., Sierra 
Club, 73 F.3d at 574; Hawaii's Thousand Friends, 821 F. 
Supp. at 1396. In Smithfield Foods, the court explained 
that, "[w]hen a company delays or avoids certain costs of 
capital and operations and maintenance necessary for 
compliance, the company is able to use those funds for 
other income-producing activities, such as investing that 
money in their own company." Id. at 349. Therefore, it 
concluded that in that case, "the avoided and/or delayed 
cost of compliance, and the weighted average cost of capital 
(WACC) as a discount/interest rate in the economic benefit 
calculation, to be both the best and the appropriate method 
to determine how much money defendants made on the 
funds they did not spend for compliance." Id. at 349 
(footnote omitted). 
 
This case is unusual because Dean Dairy's delay in 
constructing a pretreatment plant was not beneficial to its 
"bottom line"; in effect, Dean Dairy was actually penalizing 
itself in failing to promptly build the pretreatment plant. 
Our general assumption of the reasonable capitalist went 
awry with this company. 
 
There are methods other than the delayed or avoided 
capital expenditure for ascertaining economic benefit, a fact 
the appellant and the amici decline to acknowledge. It is 
significant that neither the statute nor the case law 
supports the contention that the cost-avoidance method is 
the only permissible method of determining the amount a 
polluter has gained from violating the law. In Smithfield 
Foods, though the court applied the delayed or avoided 
costs method, it "acknowledge[d] there are various methods 
for calculating defendants' economic benefit gained from 
noncompliance." 972 F. Supp. at 349. 
 
In contrast to the situation in Smithfield Foods, the "cost- 
avoided" method of determining economic benefit is not a 
method that fits the facts that were presented to the district 
court because Dean Dairy did not profit by delaying its 
construction of the pretreatment plant. But it clearly gained 
other economic benefits by failing to adopt the method that 
was readily available. The wastewater from the Fairmont 
plant is created by the required daily cleaning of its vats 
and other processing equipment. A reduction of production 
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would reduce the wastewater. Thus, if Dean Dairy wanted 
to avoid the cost entailed by the purchase of new 
equipment, it had the option of reducing volume. 
 
The approach adopted by the district court is not in 
conflict with the CWA or basic economic principles. A 
violator who chooses to continue to violate its permit while 
experimenting with less costly remedies necessarily 
subjects itself to the surrender via penalty of any economic 
benefit it acquired. The fact that the violator has also 
penalized itself by failing to implement cost-effective 
methods that would have put it into compliance with its 
permit and thereby save it money is certainly no basis to 
mitigate its penalty. 
 
Requiring a company to reduce the amount of pollution 
it creates to comply with its permit is not unreasonable. As 
the court in Tyson Foods stated: "There was one simple and 
straightforward way for Tyson to avoid paying civil penalties 
for violations of the Clean Water Act: After purchasing the 
plant, Tyson could have ceased operations until it was able 
to discharge pollutants without violating the requirements 
of its . . . permit. Tyson chose not to do this and it must 
now bear the consequences of that decision." 897 F.2d at 
1141-42. Similarly, Dean Dairy chose neither what proved 
to be the economically sensible option (building the 
pretreatment facility) nor the alternative option of reducing 
the amount of wastewater produced. Accordingly, it must 
bear the consequences. 
 
Appellant and the amici argue that the use of the 
"wrongful profits" method to calculate economic benefit 
contravenes EPA policy. They base this argument on the 
EPA's interim Clean Water Act Settlement Penalty Policy 
Guide published in 1995, which states that the "objective of 
the economic benefit calculation is to place violators in the 
same financial position as they would have if they complied 
on time." App. at 244. The appellant focuses on language in 
the Guide that explains that "[p]ersons that violate the 
Clean Water Act are likely to have obtained an economic 
benefit as a result of delayed or completely avoided 
pollution control expenditures during the period of 
noncompliance." Id. Thus, this reference to delay and 
avoidance and the EPA's creation of computer software 
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("the BEN model") to calculate a violator's economic benefit 
from delaying or avoiding compliance has led appellant to 
conclude that this is the only approach to determining 
economic benefit. 
 
However, the EPA guideline itself notes that this 
approach may not always be applicable. The policy states: 
 
       [I]f the violator is a privately-owned regulated utility, 
       the standard BEN model may not be appropriate. In 
       this situation, the Agency should consider a wrongful 
       profits analysis and seek to recover the profits and 
       other competitive market benefits the violator obtained 
       as a result of operating during the period of 
       operation. . . . In a few unusual cases, economic benefit 
       may be negative: this means, e.g., operating the old 
       efficient system was more expensive than purchasing 
       and operating a new, more efficient treatment system. 
       When economic benefit is negative, the settlement 
       calculation enters zero as the economic benefit. 
 
App. at 245-46 (emphasis added). 
 
Even the EPA guideline, on which Dean Dairy relies, is 
receptive to a wrongful profits analysis where appropriate. 
But the EPA policy is not applicable here because, by its 
own express terms, it is not "intended for use by EPA, 
violators, courts or administrative judges in determining 
penalties at a hearing or trial." App. at 243. See also 
Laidlaw I, 956 F. Supp. at 601 ("the policy expressly states 
that it is not to be used by a court in determining a penalty 
at a trial . . . . [therefore] it will not be considered in 
arriving at an appropriate penalty amount"). Finally, the 
conclusive evidence that the "wrongful profits" approach to 
economic benefit does not conflict with EPA's policy is the 
fact that its representative is on the brief for the 
government arguing in support of that approach here. 
 
We conclude that the district court's method of 
calculation of the penalty was within its discretion. We do 
not suggest that we have any dissatisfaction with the cost- 
avoided method of determining a violator's economic benefit 
in the usual case. However, under these unusual 
circumstances, we see no legally significant difference in 
measuring the economic benefit achieved by avoiding the 
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costs of antipollution equipment, and the economic benefits 
achieved by failing to reduce the volume of pollution 
created. Both methods aim to recoup any benefits a violator 
gained by breaking the law and which gave the violator an 
advantage vis-a-vis its competitors. The penalty thus 
achieves the leveling of the playing field intended by 
Congress. 
 
Finally, we reject Dean Dairy's claim that it was 
"ambushed" and unfairly surprised by the government's 
reliance on the "wrongful profits" theory of economic 
benefit. Although the government first identified Joint 
Exhibit 18 as the document on which it based the 
$417,000 figure in its penalty calculation in its closing 
argument, the document had already been admitted into 
evidence and was the subject of the government's trial 
examination of Koontz, Dean Dairy's plant manager, quoted 
earlier in this opinion. Dean Dairy did not question Koontz 
on this document nor did it call Ron Crock, its own 
controller, who prepared the figures in the document, for 
an explanation. If Dean Dairy was content to allow those 
figures to go to the factfinder without cross-examining 
Koontz and examining Crock, then it cannot reasonably 
argue only after the district court's opinion, forthcoming six 
months later, that the figures don't mean what they say. 
 
Dean Dairy vehemently contends that it was given 
inadequate notice of the government's theory. Our 
examination of the record establishes that the government 
gave Dean Dairy ample notice that it was pursuing this 
theory of economic benefit. The government's pretrial 
memorandum states that "Dean Dairy was operating its 
Fairmont plant at a percentage over capacity, thus 
increasing its profits at the expense of violating" the CWA, 
and that this "economic benefit, separate from capital 
costs, was substantial for each year of production." Supp. 
App. at 748. The government's trial brief also emphasized 
that Dean Dairy "enjoyed financial benefits during the 
period of noncompliance" because its "production 
operations were neither halted nor adversely impacted by 
its noncompliance." App. at 768. The government's opening 
statement promised to "present evidence showing what 
Dean itself estimated as the amount of revenue it would 
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lose if it decreased production to levels that would comply 
with its permit." Supp. App. at 734. Dean Dairy never 
requested a continuance of the bench trial to answer those 
contentions. 
 
Moreover, although Dean Dairy repeatedly refers to the 
government's stipulation that Dean Dairy did not realize 
any economic benefit from delaying the capital expenditures 
needed to achieve compliance with the IU permit, the 
government carefully reserved the argument that Dean 
Dairy could have received economic benefit from other 
actions. Indeed, at trial government counsel specifically 
stated: 
 
       [T]he United States is preserving the argument with 
       respect to economic benefit to other actions that the 
       dairy could have taken. In other words, we are talking 
       about production or other matters aside from the 
       capital expenditures, as well as the maintenance costs 
       associated with the actual hardware that was brought 
       on-line at the dairy facility. 
 
App. at 288. 
 
Finally, although six months elapsed after the close of 
the trial during which the parties prepared and submitted 
post trial briefs, which we have examined, Dean Dairy 
never argued that it had been unprepared by the 
government's theory or method of proof. Only after the 
district court's opinion fixing the penalty did it raise these 
claims. By then, it was too late. Under these circumstances, 
we cannot accept Dean Dairy's claim that it was unfairly 
surprised by either its use of the "wrongful profits" 
approach of economic benefit or the basis of the calculation 
of the penalty. 
 
B. 
 
Consideration of the Finances of 
Dean Dairy's Parent Company 
 
In analyzing the "economic impact on the violator," one of 
the six factors the statute lists as relevant to the CWA 
penalty, the district court stated it would look to the 
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finances of Dean Dairy's parent, Dean Foods. Among the 
reasons it gave were that "Dean Foods was closely involved 
with Fairmont [Dean Dairy's plant] in evaluating the 
options for resolving Fairmont's wastewater problems, and 
it had complete control over whether and when Fairmont 
would achieve compliance with its IU permit." 929 F. Supp. 
at 808. The district court also stated that "[a]t the same 
time, Dean Foods was siphoning off profits from Fairmont." 
Id. 
 
Dean Dairy contends that it was legal error for the 
district court to consider the financial condition of Dean 
Foods because the parent corporation was not a party to 
the action, it did not violate the Clean Water Act, and there 
was insufficient evidence to pierce the corporate veil. We 
reject its contention. Notwithstanding the arguments made 
in the brief and before us orally, it is important to 
remember that it was not Dean Foods, but only Dean Dairy, 
the violator, who was penalized. The reference to Dean 
Foods' financial statement merely assured that the penalty 
would not be set at a level above Dean Dairy's ability to 
pay. If the subsidiary does not retain its revenues, as the 
evidence showed in this case, then its parent'sfinancial 
resources are highly relevant. Other courts in CWA cases 
have looked to the assets and finances of the violator's 
parent in evaluating the economic impact of the penalty on 
a violator, see Universal Tool, 786 F. Supp. at 753; PIRG v. 
Powell Duffryn, 720 F. Supp. 1158, 1166 (D.N.J. 1989), 
reversed in part on other grounds, 913 F.2d 64 (3d Cir. 
1990), and we see nothing improper in the same action 
here. 
 
The consideration of a parent's financial condition in 
assessing a penalty on a subsidiary is a far cry from 
piercing the corporate veil and holding the parent liable for 
the actions of its subsidiary; here the penalty was assessed 
against the subsidiary alone. Furthermore, the district 
court only considered Dean Foods' assets as one factor 
among others; they were not dispositive. The court simply 
undertook a fact-specific assessment that examined the role 
of the parent in the operations of the subsidiary, 
particularly with regard to the issue of pollution of the 
nearby waters and actions that could have resolved it. 
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Although Dean Dairy contends that any evaluation of its 
financial condition would show that it lost over one million 
dollars between 1992 and 1995, there was also evidence 
that it had over twenty million dollars in assets infiscal 
year 1995. App. at 586-88. In light of the discretion 
afforded a district court in determining a penalty, we 
conclude that the court's examination of the parent's 
assets, the basis for which it was done, and the manner in 
which the information was used was neither clear error nor 
an abuse of discretion. 
 
III. 
 
For the foregoing reasons, the order of the district court 
will be affirmed. 
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